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Abstract. The paper deals with the identification of protected assets in the model metro station,
which is a part of critical infrastructure in Praha; and with the identification of their criticality. A
metro station is used by a lot of people and it involves many expensive components and devices
with interdependences which form a system of systems. The system, its components and fittings are
very vulnerable to damages from disasters of many kinds. The first step of ensuring metro station
safety is the identification of basic metro assets which are important for safe metro operation and for
human (employee and passengers) security and environment safety; and the other is determination of
criticalities of considered assets with taking into account all relevant sources of hazards. These facts
are input data for further processes which are important for safe metro operation under the different
conditions.
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1. Introduction
A metro is very important means of transportation
in cities. Therefore, to its safety it is pursued special
attention, and it is part of critical infrastructure, to
which it is now concentrated special attention because
especially at critical situation its status predetermines
the capability of human society to ensure human sur-
vival [1]. Metro is composed from fix and movable
parts; the fix ones are structure element, stations
and tunnels with many fittings; the movable ones are
trains [2]. The paper takes into account the metro
stations.
Each metro station is equipped by many technical
devices and fittings that ensure metro operation and
comfort space for passengers. From safety reasons it
also involves support elements for safety operation
of station; they are for instance construction design,
operation devices and systems, control systems, pro-
tection systems, electronic devices like lifts, escalators,
air conditioning, trains and systems for train control,
communication systems, staff etc. Mentioned elements
including the humans and personnel staff of station
are in interaction each other and they create complex
system prone to harm [2]. Moreover, the system is
mostly part of whole transportation infrastructure -
connections with track and next stations, material,
energetic and informatics flows, and number of served
persons.
It is reality that devices and fittings that are very
vulnerable to damages from disasters of many kinds [3].
From the protection reasons in the practice it is neces-
sary to identify the protected assets and to establish
their criticalities taking into account all relevant dis-
asters, i.e. the sources of hazards, and to consider
possible risks. This procedure is a common part of
formation of safety management systems in all sys-
tems, i.e. also in railway domain. The first step is the
identification of basic metro assets that are important
for safe metro operation and for human (employee
and passengers) security; and the other is the deter-
mination of criticalities of these assets.
2. Critical Assets and Critical
Infrastructure Protection
For ensuring the humans security and development,
there is necessary the safe human system [3]. Ba-
sic assets of human system called basic public assets
are: human lives and health, property and welfare,
environment, and also critical infrastructures and tech-
nologies. It means that the critical infrastructure is
one of important asset of human system. Therefore,
its protection is specially ensured in the EU, USA, Ger-
many, Canada etc. [1]. In the Czech Republic critical
infrastructure it includes nine infrastructures [1] [4],
i.e. infrastructure for:
• energy (electricity; gas; heat energy; oil and
petroleum products) supplies,
• handling with water (drinking and industrial water;
secure and manage the surface water and under-
ground water resources; waste water system),
• food supplies and agriculture operation (food pro-
duction; care for food; agricultural production),
• health care (pre-hospital emergency care; hospital
care; the protection of public health; the production,
storage and distribution of pharmaceuticals and
medical devices),
• transportation system (road; rail; air; water),
• cyber-communication and information systems
(fixed telecommunication network services; services
of mobile telecommunication networks, radio com-
munication and navigation; television and satellite
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communications radio; postal and courier services;
internet and data services),
• the banking and financial sector (management of
public finance; banking; insurance; the capital mar-
ket),
• emergency services (Fire Rescue Brigade CR; units
of fire protection for area coverage; Police of Czech
Republic; Army of Czech Republic; radiation moni-
toring; forecasting, warning and mouthpiece for the
service etc.),
• public administration (State administration and
self-administration; social protection and employ-
ment; the State social support and social assistance;
performance of judiciary and prison system).
The transportation infrastructure includes road,
rail, air and water infrastructure. Each of mentioned
infrastructures is composed from elements and line
structures. The protection of transportation infras-
tructure in the Czech Republic is only concentrated
to the elements according to the crisis act (act No.
240/2000 Col.). It means that metro station is key
asset, and therefore, we deal with its safety.
Transportation system provides the transportation
of persons and goods. It includes all modes of trans-
port, which, under the coordination of the various
transport systems work together and creates a logis-
tical network. The transportation network, together
with energy network can be considered as the founda-
tion of economic prosperity of the State. The trans-
portation network consists of separate parts that make
up self-reliant closed units. Each unit is a unit, the ba-
sis of which is the type of transport, accompanied by
complex operational and administrative parts, which
forms subsystems. The characteristic feature of tech-
nological units is their specialized ability to separate
traffic operation. It is necessary to recognize that
the individual parts are bound by the rules of their
transport logistics, which coordinates the activities.
In the Czech Republic the transport network consists
of: rail transport system; the road transport system;
the air transport system; and water transport system.
Transport system and its subsystems are vulnerable
to natural disasters, the traffic accidents, technologi-
cal accidents of facilities and buildings being in their
vicinity, crimes, terroristic attacks, organizing acci-
dents, war etc. [1] [3] [4]. Figure 1 shows the processes
that are sources of disasters [3].
To ensure safety of each entity, i.e. each infrastruc-
ture and their components it is necessary to manage
the safety by the way as is expressed by process model
in Figure 2 [1] [5].
The safety needs to be formed on all levels of gov-
ernance [3] [4] [5], as it is depicted in Figure 3.
The ways of coping with risks are shown in Fig-
ure 4 [3] [4] [5].
Each real system is composed from various het-
erogeneous subsystems, links and flows among them,
so-called inter and intra-dependences. Subsystems
Figure 1. Sources of disasters in the Human sys-
tem [3].
Figure 2. Process model for formation of safety of
entity under account [1] [5].
Figure 3. Levels of safety management [3] [4] [5].
Figure 4. Measures used for get over risks connected
with disasters [3] [4] [5].
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is possible categorized as controlled and control sys-
tems in the view of control. For improving system
parameters (dependability, security, safety, etc.) the
support systems are implemented, for instance a pro-
tection system reducing the risks. A subsystem can be
classified as safety related, the safety related system
carries out very important functions which failures or
malfunctions could lead to improving the risks and
event to accidents [6]. From the protection reasons on
the concept of integral safety of complex technologi-
cal facilities in the practice it is necessary to identify
the protected assets and to establish their criticalities
taking into account all relevant sources of hazards.
3. Data on Metro in Praha and
Metro Station Model
Stations of metro in the Praha capital are not the
same; they have differences due to their locations
in different site conditions and demands in the time
of their building. All are threatened by disasters
that threaten the Praha capital, i.e. its buildings,
structures and facilities, and locally also by specific
phenomena that are associated with local conditions,
which are connected with local vulnerabilities. There-
fore, for research needs we developed a model station
that has characteristics that are common to all the
stations of reference system taking into account the
Praha land-use plan [7] and the Praha metro docu-
mentation [2] [8] [9] [10].
The structural parts of Praha metro were con-
structed according to the Building Law (to 2006 Act.
No. 50/1976 Col., from 2006 Act No. 183/2006 Col.),
the engineering parts and cyber technique were har-
monised with demand of Building Law so they might
obtain permission for operation. The metro opera-
tion control is performed according to the standards
[11] [12] and it satisfies requirements given in stan-
dards [13] [14] [15].
The model metro station contains all elements, links
and flows that are same in all metro stations because
they are determined by the requirements of mentioned
Building Law; i.e. we follow general features and do
not study the details in structure, devices, fittings of
both, the technical and the cyber domains. The detail
studies of individual stations reveal real vulnerabilities
that cannot be open to the public from the safety
reasons. Such detail studies have been performed
for the metro operator, and they are used for metro
safety upgrade. The sources of phenomena that can
damage the metro system will be discussed in the next
chapter in which we use the advanced principle based
on All-Hazard-Approach [16].
Considering the principle Defence-In-Depth de-
scribed for complex technological facilities in [17] we
shall mostly concentrates to the management units
that keep the sufficient level of safety at normal, ab-
normal and critical conditions. Safety management
system of metro (SMS) has central control system
and controlled systems in each metro model station,
Figure 5. It is very complex distributed system that
involves controlled, control and protection subsystems,
their interdependences, operation states and condi-
tions.
Figure 5. Control and controlled system in metro
model station [6].
Metro station has subsystems stationary, track and
on-board. On the basis of results in [6] obtained by
application of principles given in [17] we select the
main metro station assets in individual main parts.
Technological parts and some support sub-
systems of controlled system include assets:
(1.) Energetic devices: transformer substations and
distribution transformers,
(2.) Communication equipment: communication ca-
bles, VHF connection with trains; passengers in-
formation systems including automatic check-in;
communication systems for passengers and staff;
CCTV, telephone, public address; clocks and fire
alarms; protection systems and signalling,
(3.) Machinery: escalators; pump stations in nodes
in stations and between them; elevators; workshops
and warehouses maintenance stations,
(4.) Air conditioning,
(5.) Mobile machines and devices: rolling-stock; de-
vices and substances for cleaning, including the
containers, cleaning machines, ladders, scaffolding
for cleaning the lighting systems; fire protection
equipment,
(6.) Next important equipment: security keys and
alarm buttons; equipment for fire alarm start; trac-
tion devices and lighting; track devices, the main
water shut; moving stairs, plates, signal panel for
machinery devices; closing equipment (shutters).
Praha metro control centre has denotation Operation
Control Centre - OCC. It has Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system that monitors
technological facilities and processes and enables their
control. Its variant used in the Czech Republic has
denotation ASDŘ-D (automatic dispatcher system for
transport control). The SCADA has several parts
that are responsible, for: transport (UGTMS - Ur-
ban Guided Transport Management and Command /
Control System); energetic tasks; technologies; com-
munication and lighting.
The control system involves following assets:
• train dispatcher (surveillance and control of trains);
and OCC nodes, station nodes, nodes for automatic
route setting system – ASDŘ-D,
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• energetic dispatcher – ASDŘ-E,
• technological dispatcher – ASDŘ-T,
• lighting system dispatcher – ADRŘ-O,
• communiation and protection systems dispatching,
• fire dispatching,
• depot dispatching for train services and mainte-
nance.
For a model metro station, the control system involves
station that are also assets:
• station nodes of control system,
• station node for automatic route setting,
• station nodes for connection of energetic and tech-
nological dispatching,
• station nodes for central lighting control system,
• station interacting with dispatchers (communica-
tion, protection, operation, fire men).
In the railway practice context a protection sys-
tem is primary understand as system needed to miti-
gation of risks connected with train operation. It is
also asset. They are:
• station protection systems (ESA 11 M),
• wayside protection systems (AŽD 71, ESA 11 M),
• train protection systems (MATRA and on-board
units).
The metro stations also ready on flows that are also
assets, it goes on:
• energetic flow,
• information flow,
• central dispatching and station nodes of control
system,
• central dispatching and station communication
units,
• station nodes of control system and protection sys-
tems,
• station nodes of control system and communication
system,
• protection systems and technologies (on the track
and on-board)-telephone connection between cen-
tral dispatching (OCC) and station,
• telephone connection between central dispatching
and trains.
Controlled, control and support (protection) sys-
tems are not just electronical and mechanical devices,
they can be also organization processes, other commu-
nication and information parts of the system, human
resources and place which shall be taken into account
in the assets identification context.
In the Czech practice the European directives and
standards are respected for safety management of rail-
way systems; there are taken in account: Common
Safety Methods [18] [19], EN 50126-1 [13], CLC/TR
50126-2 [20], EN 62290 [14] [15], EN 92267 [21].
Railway domain is regulated by European Directive
2004/49/EC [18] that establishes duties for national
authorities. The mentioned directive refers also to
railway interoperability and safety. According to the
directive Regulation 402/2013 on The Common Safety
Methods for risk assessment [19], there take into ac-
count only risks connected with human harm. Reason
is an effort to ensuring the safety of passengers, em-
ployees, level-crossing users, unauthorised persons on
the track and to ensuring the total safety on the basis
of the above categories.
Weakness of mentioned directive is that it does not
consider other assets which affect to people lives and
healthy, it means public assets, important technologi-
cal parts, facilities, any processes and infrastructure
functions. The directives are insufficient for critical
infrastructure needs and it does not provide assets
protection. Moreover, mentioned directives are not
apply to special railway systems like metro.
Railway standard EN 50126 [13] defines the specifi-
cation and demonstration of Reliability, Availability,
Maintainability and Security (RAMS) for a railway
system including the metro. The standard defines
whole life cycle including the concept and design of
the system, through operation, maintenance, recon-
struction, and up to decommissioning of the system.
Risk management is included there, but it considers
only risks affect to human, it means risk R = Rate (of
accidents) x Degree of Severity (of Harm); according to
CLC/TR 50126-2:2007 [20] in this context harm may
imply: human harm (causing injures, fatalities); and
also environmental harm (damage to property, spread
toxic substances, other impacts, etc.). Most railway
safety studies tend to concentrate on human harm.
(CLC/TR 50126-2:2007). Security requirements to
integral safety improving are not still covered. Stan-
dard EN 62290 [14] [15] defines requirement for Urban
Guided Transportation Management and Control /
Command System which is split into 5 degrees of
automation. Each degree of automation (GOA) has
specific demands and set of functional requirements.
Although a standardisation commission has been es-
tablished, no standard with safety requirements has
been prepared [21].
Better approach is included in EN 62267 [21] for
fully Automated Guided Transport (AUGT). The stan-
dard refer to EN 50126 [13] about risk management
but it imposes demand on assets protection. Identified
protected assets by the standard are: persons (pas-
sengers, staff, external emergency services, public);
and property, shall be defined by railway authority
and operator (infrastructure of whole system, trains,
equipment, etc.) [22].
The European standard is intended to very short
group of railway system and it does not establish
methods for determining the protected assets.
The characteristic pattern of model metro
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station is composed from data mentioned
above and the facts that are summarised in
[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22].
4. Disasters considered in
Research
Since in the Czech Republic there is held long-term
use of building codes and high quality engineering
practice there are metro stations relatively well pro-
tected against design disasters of natural and tech-
nological origin that belong to the term All-Hazard-
Approach [16], which ensures fixed safety level in these
cases. The problems are connected with further disas-
ters that belong to the term All-Hazard-Approach [16]
but they were been introduced into practice later. It
involves the following types of disasters:
• so called organisational accidents [3] [4] [5] [17]
because these disaster sources have been considered
since the end of 80s of last century,
• having the origin in cyber domain or in interdepen-
dences of different nature in system [3] [4] [5] [17]
because these disaster sources have been considered
since the end 90s of last century,
• damaging phenomena caused by intentional human
activities as crime or terroristic attack [3] [4] [5] [17]
because these disaster sources come to size after
2000.
From above reasons last designated disasters were
not considered in original designing the metro stations,
and therefore, we will pay special attention to them.
Data for the research we obtained from the sources
on the Praha metro [2] [8] [10]. All above mentioned
metro station assets are threatened by disasters. For
Praha capital and its facilities according to [5] [7] the
following disasters are relevant:
(1.) The results of the processes inside and outside
the earth: flood; tornado; earthquake; liquefaction
of the ground; landslide,
(2.) The results of the human body, human behaviour
and processes in human society: epidemics; pan-
demics; failure of the stability of human society
(welfare disruption, criminality); assault; terrorist
attack; attack using the chemical, nuclear, radio-
logical and biological (CBRNE) weapons; armed
conflict; war,
(3.) Results of the processes and activities installed
by people: industrial accident; accident during the
transport or storage of hazardous substances; acci-
dent at transportation; failure of critical infrastruc-
ture; failure in economy; failure in cyber infrastruc-
ture; failure of supply chains; loss of serviceability,
(4.) Interaction of Earth and environment to activi-
ties of people: disruption of bedrock stability due
to vibration; air pollution; water pollution; rapid
climate changes; migration of large groups of people,
(5.) Internal dependences in the human system (nat-
ural or man-made): organizational accident; failure
of flows of raw materials and products; disturbance
in the flow of energy; failure in the information flow.
5. Method of Determination of
Model Netro Assets
Criticality
To ensure the safety of model metro station it is
necessary to know the criticality of whole metro sys-
tem and its components, i.e. in followed case it is
the model metro station [17]. As it was said above,
each metro station is threatened by disasters, i.e. its
safety depends on the quality of the work with the
risks [5] [17]. Safety and risk are together in some way
in relation, but they are not complementary variables
(complementary value to the safety is the critical-
ity [17]). The criticality is a result of the exposure to
risk factors. There are analysed the different types
of factors: factors of human activity, decision-making
and management, factors in the non- distinguishability
of reality (because there are random and knowledge
uncertainties).
According to [17] the criticality of technological
system indicates a threshold value that means it the
values are below this threshold, so the status is de-
manded (subcritical) and vice versa. The assessment
of criticality of real system is not a trivial matter,
because the elements and whole have different roles
for different conditions of active, reactive, amplify-
ing or dampening (but not additive), and among the
sub systems of systems of system, which is a real
entity, and each model metro station. Therefore, in
accordance with [17] for its determination we use the
method of risk engineering the Checklist [23], which
for complex technological systems is given in Table 1.
Because each system of systems (in our case metro
station) is a very complex system, the behaviour of
which cannot be easily predicted, so the assessments
from the perspective of the different sectors are of-
ten different, and therefore, it is necessary to choose
the method that conflicts does not override, but it is
trying to reasonably consider them [23]. Therefore,
it was used the method, based on the expert opinion
of five experts who knew enough the metro and its
operation, have been independent and were from the
areas:
• safety and protection of human health at work,
• protection of property,
• economy of operation,
• protection of passengers,
• technical and functional safety of operation.
The evaluation was carried out separately for each
significant disaster using the value scale listed in Ta-
ble 2.
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i Question Asst Note
1
1. Has the technological facility to incorporate the principles of inherent safety?
2. Has the control system of a technological facility (SMS) set the basic
control functions, alarms and the response of the operator set up so that the
technological facility in normal (steady) state?
3. Has management system (SMS) instrumentation (built-in safety instructions)
and relevant physical barriers, which at derogate from the normal state to keep
technological system in a good condition, i.e. they prevent the occurrence of
unwanted phenomenon? The operation is successful, when, after the occurrence
of the abnormal state the technological facility will return to normal as a result
of resilience or after the application of corrective measures (clean-up, repair,
replacement of parts).
4. Has management system (SMS) for the case of loss of control, i.e. critical
conditions measures for emergency response that mitigate impacts on techno-
logical facility system and ensure the capability to return to a normal state?
Operation of a technological object is successful, if it is a good continuity plan,
which ensures that the technological facility shall ensure all the necessary tasks.
5. Does management system (SMS) for the case of loss of control, i.e. super-
critical (beyond design, extreme) conditions the measures for: maintaining
the operability of the technological system following its repair and mainte-
nance; item and measures to ensure the protection of public assets (people, the
environment and other assets) in the surroundings of technological facility?
. ............................................................................................................................. ........ .....
n
1. Has the technological facility to incorporate the principles of inherent safety?
2. Has the control system of a technological facility (SMS) set the basic
control functions, alarms and the response of the operator set up so that the
technological facility in normal (steady) state?
3. Has management system (SMS) instrumentation (built-in safety instructions)
and relevant physical barriers, which at derogate from the normal state to keep
technological system in a good condition, i.e. they prevent the occurrence of
unwanted phenomenon? The operation is successful, when, after the occurrence
of the abnormal state the technological facility will return to normal as a result
of resilience or after the application of corrective measures (clean-up, repair,
replacement of parts).
4. Has management system (SMS) for the case of loss of control, i.e. critical
conditions measures for emergency response that mitigate impacts on techno-
logical facility system and ensure the capability to return to a normal state?
Operation of a technological object is successful, if it is a good continuity plan,
which ensures that the technological facility shall ensure all the necessary tasks.
5. Does management system (SMS) for the case of loss of control, i.e. supercrit-
ical (beyond design, extreme) conditions the measures for: item maintaining
the operability of the technological system following its repair and mainte-
nance; item and measures to ensure the protection of public assets (people, the
environment and other assets) in the surroundings of technological facility?
Table 1. Identification of deficiencies for specific disasters in a given territory, i = 1, 2, ..., n, i.e. assessment of the
criticality of the viewpoint of the application of access the Defence-In-Depth.
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Criticality rate Values [%]
Extremly high – 5 More than 95
Very high – 4 70-95
High – 3 45-70
Middle – 2 25-45
Low – 1 5-25
Negligible – 0 Less than 5
Table 2. Value scale according to [17].
The resulting rates of criticality for each item and
disaster are set as median [23] from particulars deter-
mined by individual experts.
6. Criticality of Assets in Model
Metro Station
On the basis of the procedure described in the previous
chapter it was obtained a set of values that are listed
in Table 3. The numbers in Table 3 indicate the
following rates of criticality:
• 0 – given disaster does not have a direct impact on
the metro station and its operation,
• 1 – given disaster has low impact on the metro
station and its operation,
• 2 – given disaster has middle impact on the metro
station and its operation,
• 3 – given disaster has high impact on the metro
station and its operation.
From Table 3, it follows that the rate of criticality is
high in many cases. While it is moderate, i.e. it is not
very high or extreme, it is necessary in the frame of
public interest to supplement the measures in all cases
where the criticality rate is high. On the basis of the
data referred to such cases according to [17] [24] it is
necessary to perform in all cases where the criticality
rate is 3 the following:
• the analysis of the ability/competence of operator
of metro to handle with emergency situations in the
station and in the infrastructure,
• the inventory of available resources for quick and
proper response to the emergency situation in a
metro station in the subway,
• the assessment of current vulnerability of items of
metro stations and the entire metro subway,
• the specification of the coordination of activities
to support the continuity of subway stations and
underground infrastructure,
• the division of responsibilities for actions to pro-
mote the continuity of the subway stations and
underground infrastructure,
• the setting up the organisational instructions and
features to support the renovation of subway sta-
tions and underground infrastructure,
• the establishment of criteria for the selection of
main features of elements of subway stations and
underground infrastructure,
• the determination of support processes that support
the main features of subway infrastructure,
• identification of key personnel, to ensure the con-
tinuity of the subway stations and underground
infrastructure,
• prioritizing the main functions on the basis of the
criticality of time, sequence of key recovery pro-
cesses and personnel capacity.
7. Conclusion
From the protection reasons on the concept of integral
safety of complex technological facilities in the prac-
tice it is necessary to identify the protected assets and
to establish their criticalities taking into account all
sources of hazards. The results of performed research
show that metro stations have a certain level of safety
(according to [17] it holds that level (rate) of safety =
1 – criticality rate). However, it is necessary to carry
out the measures referred to in the previous chapter,
because there are items for which in the occurrence
of large (i.e. beyond design extreme) disasters there
are get to significant impacts of disasters, which have
the ability to disrupt seriously the metro station and
the entire infrastructure. It means that present stan-
dards and legislative do not provide sufficient range
for integral safety, including the safety of important
assets and systems that predispose sufficient human
security and human society development.
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3 3 3 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0
Mobile machines and devices
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0
1 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 0
2 1 1 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0
Next important equipment
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0
1 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 0
2 1 1 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0
Station nodes of control systems
of metro system
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 0
3 2 2 0 0 0 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 0
Protection systems
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 0
3 2 2 0 0 0 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 0
Linkages and flows
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 2 0 0 0 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
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[11] ČR. ČSN EN 13816 (269389) Doprava – Logistika a
služby – Veřejná přeprava osob – definice jakosti služby,
cíle a měření, 2003.
[12] ČR. ČSN EN ISO 9001:2009 (01 0321) Systémy
managementu kvality – Požadavky, 2009.
[13] ČR. ČSN EN 50126-1 (333502) Drážní zařízení –
Stanovení a prokázání bezporuchovosti, pohotovosti,
udržovatelnosti a bezpečnosti (RAMS): Část 1:
Základní požadavky a generický proces, 2001.
[14] ČR. ČSN EN 62290-1:2006 (33 3530) Drážní
zavrízení – Systémy řízení městské dopravy s
vyhrazenou vodicí dráhou: Část 1: Systémové principy
a základní pojmy, 2007.
[15] ČR. ČSN EN 62290-2:2011 (33 3530) Drážní zařízení
– Systémy řízení městské dopravy s vyhrazenou vodicí
dráhou: Část 2: Specifikace funkčních požadavkøu, 2009.
[16] FEMA. Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations
Planning [online], 1996.
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/slg101.pdf.
[17] D. Procházková. Bezpečnost složitých technologických
systémøu, 2015. ISBN 978-8001-05771-1.
[18] EU. Directive 2002/49/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relating to
the assessment and management of environmental noise
– Declaration by the Commission in the Conciliation
Committee on the Directive relating to the assessment
and management of environmental noise, 2002.
36
vol. 5/2016 Assets of Model Metro Station and Their Criticality
[19] EU. Regulation 402/2013 on the CSM for risk
assessment and repealing Regulation 352/2009, 2002.
[20] CELENEC. CLC/TR 50126-2:2007 Railway
applications. The specification and demonstration of
reliability, availability, maintainability and safety
(RAMS). Guide to the application of EN 50126-1 for
safety, 2013.
[21] IEC. Project IEC 62290-3 Ed. 1.0: Railway
applications – Urban guided transport management and
command/control systems – Part 3: System
requirements specifications, 2015.
[22] ČR. ČSN EN 62267 (33 3532) Drážní zařízení –
Automatizovaná městská doprava s vyhrazenou vodící
dráhou (AUGT) – Bezpečnostní požadavky, 2009.
[23] D. Procházková. Metody, nástroje a techniky pro
rizikové inženýrství, 2011. ISBN 97880-01-04842-9.
[24] D. Procházková. Základy řízení bezpečnosti kritické
infrastruktury, 2013. ISBN 978-80-01-05245-7.
37
